2 big six banks were crucial for clearing inter-regional payments; they were storehouses for interior bank deposits and accounted for nearly 80 percent of the net liabilities to banks (correspondent bank deposits in New York City banks) held by New York City national banks.
2 In 1907, it was essential that the largest New York City national banks requested clearing house loan certificates from the Clearing House because the aggregate resources of the other, smaller banks were likely insufficient to provide the credit necessary to generate the liquidity to alleviate a crisis. The dominance of the large national banks in New York City in 1907 offers a contrast to an observation from the issuance of clearing house loan certificates in 1873 in New York City. In 1873, banking assets in New York
City were not as highly concentrated and the big national banks required cooperation from a large number of smaller banking organizations to issue a sufficient volume of loan certificates. By 1907, the large, national banks in New York City were the only participants with the resources sufficient to affect aggregate liquidity.
We examine clearing house loan certificates issued during the Panic of 1907 among New York Clearing House member banks by exploiting underutilized data that list the borrowing bank identity, the loan amount, and the issue date. The existing research, to our knowledge, has not examined high frequency data for clearing house loan certificate issues at the borrower level. We emphasize the high frequency time series behavior of the data because the rapid issue of a large quantity of clearing house loan certificates was an important and necessary response to quell the panic.
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The big six banks engaged in these liquidity-enhancing actions despite binding restrictions on the powers of the New York Clearing House. For example, the New York
Clearing House was legally prohibited from printing currency, and it was unable to sell or buy bonds in quantities comparable to modern open market operations. There was no legal basis for the issuance of clearing house loan certificates and, therefore, they could not serve as legal reserves. These restrictions distinguish the New York Clearing House from modern central banking institutions. Still, the New York City national banks and the clearing house loan certificates were comparable to central bank injections of temporary liquidity as observed today in periods of extreme liquidity demands.
The severe crisis in 1907 required a rapid liquidity infusion to quell the turbulence in the financial market. The issuance of clearing house loan certificates was the only mechanism available to increase the supply of a substitute for specie and legal tender in final payments among clearing house members. That substitution would allow the release of cash and specie to the general public. The loan certificates helped prevent the need for costly liquidation of bank assets, like call loans -short-term demandable loans backed by stock or bond collateral --in order to satisfy cash withdrawal demands or unfavorable clearing balances.
Clearing house loan certificates were, however, only a temporary provision of credit. For a more durable solution, the financial system required gold inflows to restore bank reserves to the legal requirements, but there was a time lag between the arrangement for gold import and the arrival of the gold. It was not until late in December of 1907 before monetary gold arrived in New York City at a dollar volume comparable to the 4 volume of clearing house loan certificates outstanding. The clearing house loan certificate issues were effectively "bridge loans" that enabled the borrowing banks to finance the importation of monetary gold. The loan certificates retained value among the Clearing House member banks because they paid interest to the bearer, and they were temporary, in anticipation of monetary gold imports arranged by the key financial institutions in New York City.
The Panic of 1907 resulted in extreme financial tightness that altered the typical movements of notable high-frequency data, like short-term interest rates and currency premiums, spikes in these series are interpreted as indicators of financial market distress.
We find that the first issues of clearing house loan certificates coincide with spikes in such indicators of financial market distress. Within several weeks of the clearing house loan certificate issues, the only notable moderation among these indicators was in the interest rate on call money loans, stock market loans backed by the collateral of the purchased stock (or bonds). A return to pre-panic conditions among indicators of financial distress took place only after the dollar volume of gold inflows surpassed $100 million, the restrictions or partial suspension of cash payments was lifted, and the vast majority of clearing house loan certificate issues were paid off and cancelled.
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II. BACKGROUND ON CLEARING HOUSE LOAN CERTIFICATES
a) Clearing house credit extensions to borrowing banks
During financial panics, New York City banks and other financial intermediaries faced a widespread increase in demand for cash from individual depositors and from interior banks that held deposits with New York City banks. To adapt to the absence of a 5 formal lender of last resort the New York Clearing House banks, as early as 1860, used an artificial settlement device --clearing house loan certificates -as a mechanism to provide settlement media for use among Clearing House member banks as an alternative to cash and specie. Cannon (1910) , Myers (1931) , as well as modern authors describe the institutional development of clearing house loan certificates during the National Banking Era.
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The process for issuing clearing house loan certificates relied upon the New York
Clearing House and began with its decision to issue them. First, the Executive
Committee of the New York Clearing House would agree that financial conditions warranted the issuance of clearing house loan certificates, which were perceived as an aggregate response to limited cash liquidity. Following the decision to issue clearing house loan certificates, the Executive Committee would form a loan committee comprised of representative members who had the obligation to monitor the quality of collateral that was offered by member bank borrowers of clearing house loan certificates.
Clearing house loan certificates were issues of credit -paper notes that were tradable among clearing house members, but non-negotiable in the private economy --extended by the New York Clearing House to member banks who requested them. The borrowing bank placed collateral (commercial paper, bills receivable, as well as stocks and bonds) with the New York Clearing House in order to borrow clearing house loan certificates up to 75 percent of the market value of the collateral. 5 Cannon (1910) describes the use of Clearing House loan certificates in 1860 and throughout the panics of the National Banking Era (see pages 75-115). Myers (1931, pages 98-100) notes also that a similar temporary liquidity enhancing technique was used in 1857. 6 Specie refers to precious metal (silver and gold) coinage. 7 The collateral assets that backed the clearing house loan certificate issues were heavily discounted in order to minimize the potential losses from clearing house loan certificates that could not be terminated by the borrowing bank. Cannon (1910 page 119) suggests that in 1907, about 73 percent of the collateral was 6
Clearing house loan certificates were costly to issue; in 1907, the borrowers of clearing house loan certificates paid a 6 percent annual rate of interest to the holder of the certificate. The payment of interest made the certificates desirable for Clearing House banks to hold, and the certificates traded at par with gold and legal tender among banks.
Clearing house loan certificates were issued in 1907 as an intentionally temporary supplement to liquidity, which had a limited time to maturity ranging from one month to three months. However, after maturity the borrower faced progressively rising penalty interest rates that were designed to hasten loan repayment (expiration or cancellation). In terms of volume, the New York Clearing House issued over $80 million in clearing house loan certificates, which was substantial when compared to New York Clearing House member bank reserve holdings that hovered around $250 million around the time of the panic.
The New York Clearing House played the role of intermediary for the credit extension and ensured that the borrower paid the interest charge to the holder of the clearing house loan certificate. Among other unique characteristics, the clearing house loan certificates were explicitly liabilities of the New York Clearing House, that is, the loans were backed by the collective assets of the Clearing House member banks, rather than backed by the specific assets pledged as collateral from the borrowing bank.
8 Clearing house loan certificates were then used as substitutes for the exchange of cash and specie in settling accounts among members at the Clearing House, and thereby commercial paper and the other 27 percent was stock, bonds and short-maturity railroad notes. We have verified this finding in a primary source from the reports of the New York Clearing House Loan Committee; Cannon was the chairperson of the committee. 8 Gorton and Huang (2001, 2002) infer that the Clearing House loan certificates, as general liabilities of the New York Clearing House, were a form of deposit insurance because the depositor who accepts these loan certificates in exchange for his or her deposits is exchanging a claim on a single bank for a claim on general assets of the Clearing House (the coalition of banks in general). See also Gorton and Mullineaux (1987 
b) Literature on clearing house loan certificates
Research on liquidity provision during National Banking Era financial crises highlights the aggregate issuance of clearing house loan certificates by the New York Clearing House. Specifically, these works focus on the aggregate issuance, the amount used in private transactions, and the duration of their existence as well as their use as a device to increase liquidity temporarily (see Andrew 1908 , Cannon 1910 , Timberlake 1978 , Gorton 1985 , and Gorton and Mullineaux 1987 .
As early as Andrew (1908) and Cannon (1910) By means of the clearing-house certificates they (New York clearing house banks) were enabled to increase the loans, instead of demanding payment; such demands would inevitably have aggravated the evil and precipitated serious disasters. The loans were expanded for three distinct purposes: to finance the importation of gold, to enable the furnishing of cash to interior banks; to relieve interior banks of loans (probably speculative), in the center, which they were anxious to get rid of; and to enable the security market to have some means to check the ruinous fall in prices, particularly of bonds, which had set in. By supplying loans at reasonable rates, the fall was restricted. (Muhleman 1908 , page 191) Timberlake (1984 , Gorton (1985) , and Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) Gorton and Mullineaux (1987) emphasize that the liquidation of call loans, or any other illiquid asset, would be costly for banks; clearing house loan certificates were a mechanism to liquefy temporarily a discounted amount of illiquid assets. Timberlake
(1984) provides a detailed description of the process that the Clearing Houses used to 9 issue the certificates. Timberlake (1984 Timberlake ( , 1990 as well as Gorton (1985) go further to emphasize the central banking role of private clearing houses during the crises of the national banking era. 9 In these works, the arguments support a central banking-like interpretation of the clearing house actions and emphasize the widespread demand for cash withdrawals as the main determinant for requests for clearing house loan certificates.
III. CONCENTRATION OF PAYMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY
Under the National Banking System, New York City national banks, as central 
IV. CLEARING HOUSE LOAN CERTIFICATES DURING THE PANIC
We use newly available data on clearing house loan certificates issued to member 12 The weekly numbers are totals for New York Clearing House member banks so they do not correspond exactly to the call report data for New York City national banks.
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Chart 1 displays net liabilities to banks of individual Clearing House member national banks in New York City relative to the total net liabilities of banks of Clearing
House member national banks in New York City. We plot this data series along with clearing house loan certificate issues per bank relative to total clearing house loan issuance of Clearing House member national banks in New York City. The distributions for both data transformations are skewed, which reflects the enormous influence of the big six banks in both these activities. The big six New York City national banks account for more than 2/3 ($53M of $74M) of the aggregate amount of clearing house loan certificates issued to national bank members of the New York Clearing House in 1907.
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These banks were also the most important providers of deposit services for interior banks, holding nearly 80 percent of net deposits from banks (net liabilities to banks) at New York City national banks calculated from the August 1907 call report and listed in Table   1 . The funds from bank deposits were used to extend call loans at the stock market. As mentioned above, the onset of panic made the rapid issuance of clearing house loan certificates important to prevent the undesirable premature sale of illiquid collateral. Andrew (1910) . Domestic exchange rates were from Table 15 , page 217, Andrew (1910) . The reserve deficiency is taken calculated from the weekly aggregate numbers described below.
15 immediate palliative to the market unease. The additional injection of liquidity from clearing house loan certificates helped to maintain transactions activity (stock trading volume) in the stock market, and likely reduced the call loan interest rate directly. These outcomes were clearly important for the large, New York City national banks. Nearly 1/3 of the loans by the big six national banks were allocated to call loans on the stock market.
a) Timing of Clearing House Loan Certificate Issues
The 
b) The Big Six New York City National Banks
The call report balance sheet data indicates a net contraction of cash reserves at the big six banks from August 22, 1907 to December 3, 1907 of nearly $27 million ($16.7 million in specie, $9.9 million in legal tender). Despite a contraction in cash reserves among the big six banks, these banks borrowed nearly twice that amount ($53 million) in clearing house loan certificates. 18 The big six banks also increased their loans over this period by over $40 million, some of which funded an increase in call loans taken over from trust companies (see Muhleman 1908, page 193) .
Chart 6 presents the changes in the specie component of reserves at the big six banks individually using call report dates (there were five call dates per year) from describe the relationship between net gold inflows and clearing house loan certificates using data listed in Table 3 and displayed in Chart 7. Table 3 (2007) for a further examination of the banking reform movement that followed the panic. 22 Clearing house loan certificates as a tool to increase liquidity provided the U.S. with a version of lender of a last resort, even though the episodes when they were issued reflect a response to an aggregate liquidity shortage. The clearing house loan certificate issue could also address another role for a lender of last resort, that is, to provide a mechanism to address individual bank disturbances. From that perspective, the clearing house loan certificate mechanism may have provided the likely inspiration or a crude model for the creation of the discount window facility in the Federal Reserve Act.
period. 23 The gold inflows were sparked by the currency premium that appeared in response to the suspension of convertibility. The gold standard fixed the dollar/pound exchange rate at $4.86656 per pound, but there was a range in which the exchange rate could fluctuate with promoting gold imports or exports--the "gold points." At a rate below $4.8442 it became profitable to import gold. Immediately after suspension was announced sight exchange rate fell to $4.82125, but it was the currency premium which made gold imports quite profitable for several weeks after that (Tallman and Moen 2010, pp. 12-13) . A simple regression reveals the impact of the currency premium on net gold imports ( Table 4) . The regression equation is described below:
be suggestive rather than conclusive. 24 This specification is presented in equation (1) as follows:
where: NGI = Net gold imports GPV = Gold point violations CUPR = Currency premium And the subscript t refers to the time period.
The first column lists the empirical estimates for a specification that includes only lagged net gold imports and the gold point violations variable. The explanatory power of the regression is modest, accounting for less than thirty percent of the variation of net gold flows over the period. When the currency premium is added to the regression, the 23 Using the weekly series on in legal reserves in New York City national banks to normalize the level of gold flows does not alter this inference significantly. 24 Gold inflows to the US from France and Germany were considered important and sizable during 1907. See Muhleman 1908, page 195. 20 regression explains over 50 percent of the variation, indicating that the gold inflows during the Panic of1907 were a huge component of net gold import (export) variation.
While the suspension of convertibility created the currency premium that provided the incentive to import gold, the issuance of loan certificates provided the mechanism that made gold imports possible. James G. Cannon (1908) explains the unrecognized role of loan certificates in facilitating the process of importing gold during the panic:
Very few people realize that in importing gold it is necessary to create a credit on the books of a bank, upon which the gold importer may draw, through the Clearing House, in payment of the cable transfers and the bills of exchange necessary to cover the amount of gold to be brought over. Clearing house loan certificates enabled the banks to make these credits, and that is the reason we were able to import such a large volume of gold during the past few months (Cannon 1908, p. 111) .
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Thus, loan certificates provided a means to increase the monetary base separate from that of simply releasing cash to panicked depositors. This function reveals a more complex role for loan certificates than is commonly believed.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
During the Panic of 1907, the issues of clearing house loan certificates demonstrate how coalitions of private banks turned illiquid loan portfolios into liquid claims as discussed in Gorton and Huang (2002) . Clearing house loan certificate 21 issuance was an intentional but temporary increase in the monetary base. It was intentional because the Clearing House Executive Committee chose to form a clearing house loan committee, whose sole purpose was to evaluate collateral and issue clearing house loan certificates to member borrowers.
The credit expansion in the form of clearing house loan certificates maintained and supported the intermediation activities of the big six New York City banks, those banks that were crucial for the operation of the payments system. Those same banks were also crucial for the operation of the stock market because they were key providers of liquidity for the call loan market. During the Panic of 1907, the big six banks faced two crucial risks. The first risk was asset value risk -the big six bank loan portfolios were over 30 percent comprised of call loans, and thereby faced the risk that the stock market values backing the loans would fall. Given the sharp decline in stock market values, it was possible that the collateral values fell below the outstanding loan value.
The second risk was withdrawal risk, the largest component arising from their substantial holdings of banker balances. Combining these two risks arising on each side of the balance sheet, the big six banks faced immense challenges during banking panics to maintain adequate liquidity to support both a functioning capital market and an effective payments system. As a result, the same big six banks had the highest likelihood of borrowing clearing house loan certificates from the Clearing House.
As the biggest banking institutions in the country, the preservation of a functioning payment system was in their best interest. Clearing house loan certificate Clearing house loan certificates can be interpreted as "bridge" or emergency loan provisions in anticipation of gold inflows, and this interpretation is consistent with earlier research (Muhleman 1908 , Goodhart 1969 . In addition, the distress signals from the financial market conveyed through the premium on cash in New York City, the premium on New York City balances within cities in the interior US, and the reserve deficit among New York City national banks suggest that the crisis was not quelled by clearing house loan certificate issues alone. Gold shipments to New York City from overseas were an essential ingredient to fostering a return to calmer financial conditions.
Foreign creditors shipped gold to the United States because of the existence of the currency premium and a perception of the credit-worthiness of the New York City banks and of the US financial system more generally. These certificate issues were credible to the public only because there was ample credit available from overseas markets from which gold could be imported. International bankers overseas shipped gold to the United States because market participants overseas believed that the US would remain on the gold standard. The participants in those overseas markets also perceived that the financial system in the United States was in disarray, but essentially solvent.
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As holders of nearly 80 percent of banker balances held in New York City national banks, the big six banks faced the risk of large-scale withdrawal of cash reserves from the depositor banks. The big six national banks in New York City borrowed the predominant amount of clearing house loan certificates that enabled them to send cash to the interior and prevent call loan contractions during the panic. However, the volume of clearing house loans certificates issued to the large, New York City national banks exceeded the net contraction in banker balances that they faced, which we interpret as intentional liquidity provision to the financial system. That the Big 6 banks were motivated to protect the general welfare of the banking system is not clear. Protecting their private interest, however, was certainly more aligned with the collective interest than in earlier panics. In this way, the New York Clearing House acted as a private liquidity providing institution to increase aggregate base money temporarily during the panic. The Several general features of the economy and the financial market distinguished the 1907 panic from the previous boom years. Studentski and Kroos (1963, page 252) refer to the Banking Panic of 1907 as an "exclusively banking" panic, because the source of the crisis arose from financial market activities, and hence differed from the previous financial panics during the national banking era.
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We use several monthly data series to emphasize one main conclusion: that there was an increase in the demand for liquidity for which the financial system at the time had no simple mechanism to satisfy.
Chart A1 displays the monthly stock market index value of the Cowles Commission along with the monthly Industrial Production Index (Miron and Romer 1991) from January 1900 to December 1909. The stock market index peaked prior to 1907, whereas the IP index peaks closer to the time of the panic and the two series reach 27 For discussion of the isolation of trust companies in New York City, see Moen and Tallman (2000) . 28 See Tallman (1992, 2000) The currency premium is the average of the daily observations compiled by Andrew (1908) .
The import (export) point violation uses the costs of shipping (as compiled by Officer 2010). We then calculate values for the points at which exchange rate values would stimulate gold import (or gold export). For this exercise, we use both the bid and ask exchange rates to calculate a possible violation.
Net gold imports are in this case positive (inflow of gold) and exports negative (outflow of gold). 
